LLM Security
@llm_sec
Research, papers, jobs, and news on large language model security. Got something relevant? DM / tag @llm_sec
InjecGuard: Benchmarking and Mitigating Over-defense in Prompt Injection Guardrail Models (-- look at that perf/latency pareto frontier. game on!) "State-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). We propose…


unpopular opinion: maybe let insecure be insecure and worry about the downstream effects on end users instead of protecting the companies that bake it into their own software.
the poor developers of this AI desperately playing whack-a-mole with techniques of circumventing the safety/legality filters
Call for papers: LLMSEC 2025 Deadline 15 April, held w/ ACL 2025 in Vienna Formats: long/short/war stories More: >> sig.llmsecurity.net/workshop/
Gritty Pixy "We leverage the sensitivity of existing QR code readers and stretch them to their detection limit. This is not difficult to craft very elaborated prompts and to inject them into QR codes. What is difficult is to make them inconspicuous as we do here with Gritty…

garak has moved to NVIDIA! New repo link: github.com/NVIDIA/garak
ChatTL;DR – You Really Ought to Check What the LLM Said on Your Behalf 🌶️ "assuming that in the near term it’s just not machines talking to machines all the way down, how do we get people to check the output of LLMs before they copy and paste it to friends, colleagues, course…


Automated Red Teaming with GOAT: the Generative Offensive Agent Tester "we introduce the Generative Offensive Agent Tester (GOAT), an automated agentic red teaming system that simulates plain language adversarial conversations while leveraging multiple adversarial prompting…
LLMmap: Fingerprinting For Large Language Models "With as few as 8 interactions, LLMmap can accurately identify 42 different LLM versions with over 95% accuracy. More importantly, LLMmap is designed to be robust across different application layers, allowing it to identify LLM…

Insights and Current Gaps in Open-Source LLM Vulnerability Scanners: A Comparative Analysis 🌶️ "Our study evaluates prominent scanners - Garak, Giskard, PyRIT, and CyberSecEval - that adapt red-teaming practices to expose these vulnerabilities. We detail the distinctive features…

AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents "To facilitate research on LLM agent misuse, we propose a new benchmark called AgentHarm. We find (1) leading LLMs are surprisingly compliant with malicious agent requests without jailbreaking, (2) simple universal…

Does your LLM truly unlearn? An embarrassingly simple approach to recover unlearned knowledge "This paper reveals that applying quantization to models that have undergone unlearning can restore the "forgotten" information." "for unlearning methods with utility constraints, the…

Safety comes first to deploying LLMs in applications like agents. For richer opportunities of LLMs, we mitigate prompt injections, the #1 security threat by OWASP, via Structured Queries (StruQ). Preserving utility, StruQ discourages all existing prompt injections to an ASR <2%.
the go-to method for data exfil after a successful prompt injection is rendering an image or a clickable link that's why m365 copilot refuses to print links no matter what unless of course..
🔥 Microsoft fixed a high severity data exfiltration exploit chain in Copilot that I reported earlier this year. It was possible for a phishing mail to steal PII via prompt injection, including the contents of entire emails and other documents. The demonstrated exploit chain…
Tenable Research discovered a vulnerability in Microsoft’s Copilot Studio via a server-side request forgery (SSRF), which allowed access to potentially sensitive information regarding service internals with potential cross-tenant impact tenable.com/blog/ssrfing-t…
Transferring Backdoors between Large Language Models by Knowledge Distillation "we propose ATBA, an adaptive transferable backdoor attack, which can effectively distill the backdoor of teacher LLMs into small models when only executing clean-tuning" "we exploit a shadow model…
